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Deuteros Plous, the immortality of the soul and the 
ontological argument for the existence of God 
Rafael Ferber 
University of Lucerne / University of Zurich 
Some preliminary remarks 
As we all know, Plato’s Socrates uses the term “deuteros plous” (Phd. 99c9-d1) in con-
nection with his intellectual autobiography. His intellectual life led him away from that “wis-
dom” (sophia) they call “the study of nature” (physeôs historia) (Phd. 96a8) to look at “the 
truth of things” (alêtheia tôn ontôn) in the logoi (Phd. 99e6). The study of nature, in an im-
mediate way, that is, by our sense organs, may be called the “first” (prôtos), whereas the 
“flight into the logoi” may be called the “second voyage” (deuteros plous) (Phd. 99c9-d1). 
The decisive passage runs as follows: 
[S1] edoxe dê moi chrênai eis tous logous katafugonta en ekeinois skopein tôn ontôn tên 
alêtheian.  
[S2] isôs men oun hô>i< eikazô tropon tina ouk eoiken.  
[S3] Ou gar pany synchôrô ton en tois logois skopoumenon ta onta en eikosi mallon skopein ê 
ton en tois ergois 
[S1] So I thought I must take refuge in the logoi and look at the truth of things in them.  
[S2] However, perhaps this analogy is inadequate; 
[S3] for I certainly do not admit that one who investigates things by means of logoi is dealing 
with images more than one who looks at facts (Phd. 99e4-100a3, Transl. Grube with modifi-
cation by R. F.) 
First, (I) I will give an interpretation of this passage, and then (II) I will proceed to the 
philosophical problem that this passage implies, and (III) I will apply the philosophical prob-
lem to the final proof of immortality and draw an analogy with the ontological argument for 
the existence of God, as proposed by Descartes in his 5th Meditation. 
I
“Deuteros plous” is a proverbial expression whose correct meaning had been indicated 
by Eustathios from Thessaloniki (about 1110 to about 1195) by referring to Pausanias (2nd 
century): “deuteros plous” means “the next best way,” that is, the way of those who try an-
other method if the first does not succeed, namely those who “try oars when the wind fails 
after Pausanias” (Eusth. p. 1453; cf. Burnet, 1911, p. 99; cf. Liddell-Scott et al., 19409 s.v.; 
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Martinelli Tempesta, 2003).1 There has been some dispute about whether this is really Plato’s 
intended meaning and whether the expression is not here used by Plato in an ironic way 
(Burnet, 1911, p. 99; Gadamer, 1968, p. 254),2 that is, if the second best is not the second 
best, but the best voyage for the Platonic Socrates. But after the exhaustive study of St. Mar-
tinelli Tempesta, there can be little doubt that its meaning is that of second voyage in the 
evaluative sense of inferiority to the first voyage, and that it is not used here in an ironic way 
(cf. already Murphy, 1936, p. 41, n1), as it is not used in an ironic sense in the two other oc-
currences in Plato (Phlb. 19c2-3, Plt. 300c2) and Aristotle (cf. EN B 9 1109a34-35, Pol. 
1284b19). In fact, the related comparison of the Socratic enterprise with a “raft” (Phd. 85d1) 
— instead of a boat — is also not used in an ironic way, unless it is very “complex irony”.3 
The best, or at least better, voyage is the method of direct vision of things “with my eyes,” or 
by “trying to grasp them with any of my other senses” (Phd. 99e3-4, Transl. Rowe), as travel-
ling with sails is better than moving forward with oars. The main advantage of the direct 
method is that it reaches the destination faster and in a less laborious way, although it has the 
disadvantage of being the more dangerous course and may lead to complete blindness of the 
soul, that is, complete ignorance (cf. Phd. 99e2-3; 79c7). On the other hand, the second voy-
age has the advantage of being the safer (asphalesteron) course (cf. Lg. 897e1-2), but the dis-
advantage of being slower and more laborious than the first one. Thus, the second voyage 
implies a change of means but not of the goal, that is, “to look at the truth of things” (skopein 
tôn ontôn tên alêtheian) (Phd. 99e5-6). This goal of the second best voyage implies for the 
Platonic Socrates investigating the “true” (alêthôs) (Phd. 98e1) or “real” (tô<i> onti) (Phd. 
99b3) cause, that is, the final or second-order cause of the mechanical causes, which are only 
“co-causes” (synaitia) (cf. Phd. 98c2-e1; Ti. 46c7) — quasi the cause of causes — “that 
would direct everything and arrange each thing in such a way as would be best” (Phd. 97c5-
6). Thus, Socrates starts from the anti-naturalistic assumption that nature has a teleological 
structure and that the “study of nature” should explain this structure, a project to be realized 
by Plato later in the Timaeus (cf. Ti. 30a2-7). But what is this “second best voyage” in more 
detail? 
[S1] says that it is a flight from direct perception or vision to the indirect method of the 
use of the logoi. A flight implies a turning away from something to something. The “second 
best voyage” is — so to speak — the “linguistic turn” of Socrates away from “the study of 
nature” into that which we say (dialegesthai) (cf. Phd. 63c7-8) - or dialectic. Although he 
does not yet use the substantive “dialektikê methodos” (R. 533c7), he speaks of an allos tro-
pos tês methodou (Phd. 97b6-7) to find out “the reasons of each thing — why it comes into 
-------------------------------------------- 
1 Martinelli Tempesta, 2003, p. 89: “[…] il significato del celebre proverbio utilizzato da Platone 
in Phd. 99c-d può essere soltanto quello […] di second best, come è suggerito inequivocabilmente da 
tutte le testimoninanze antiche.” Martinelli Tempesta (2003, p. 123-125) also gives a useful index of the 
passages where the expression “deuteros plous” is used in a proverbial way, and argues on p. 108-109, 
pace Kanayama (2000), against Kanayama’s interpretation of Polyb. Hist. VIII 36.6.2 B.-W. that the 
“deuteros plous” means merely the safer voyage second in time. 
2 Cf. Burnet, 1911, p. 99, ad locum: “In any case, Socrates does not believe for a moment that the 
method he is about to describe is a pis aller or ‘makeshift.’” Gadamer, 1968, p. 254: “Ein sehr 
ironischer Passus. Ich habe schon in meinem oben abgedruckten Buche 1931 ausgeführt, wie weit 
gerade die Erforschung des Seienden in den Logoi der Zugang zur Wahrheit des Seienden ist [...]”. 
Gadamer seems not to see the problem that the Socratic logoi — esp. the hypothesis of ideas — can lead 
not only to consistency but also to truth. Cf. also Thanassas, 2003, p. 10: “The ‘images of logoi’ are 
the only means at our disposal for approaching the truth of beings.” But the hypothesis of ideas is not an 
image. For Gadamer’s interpretation of the Philebus, cf. Ferber, 2010. 
3 Vlastos, 1991, 31: “In ‘complex’ irony what is said is and isn’t what is meant: its surface content 
is meant to be true in one sense, false in another.” 
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being, why it perishes, why it exists” (Phd. 96a9-10, Transl. Rowe), namely hê peri tous 
logous technê (Phd. 90b7). “It looks as if there’s a path (atrapos) that’ll bring us and our rea-
soning safely through in our search” (Phd. 66b3-4, Transl. Rowe). For this path, Socrates 
gives a negative contextual definition when he distinguishes it (a) from the “first voyage” of 
Ionian natural philosophy, because it makes no use of sense perception or proceeds a priori, 
and (b) from “antilogic,” that is, arguments that aim merely at contradiction (antilogikoi 
logoi) (Phd. 90c1). It is positively spoken of as a method of “giving an account of being” 
(logon didonai tou einai), that is, a logos tês ousias by the method of question and answer 
(“erotôntes kai apokrinomenoi”) (Phd. 78d1, cf. Burnet, 1911, ad locum). It is therefore not 
to be identified immediately with (a) the hypothetical method or (b) the theory of forms or (c) 
the explanation of things in terms of formal causes (cf. Rose, 1966; Preus/Ferguson, 1969, p. 
105). 
On the meaning of the expression “logoi” in Phd. 100a1, we do not have in our modern 
European languages a word with an equivalent meaning, and there have been a great variety 
of translations: Gedanken (Schleiermacher), Grund-Sätze (Natorp), Begriffe (Apelt), Reden 
(Rufener), discussions (Grube), ideas (Jowett), definitions (Bluck), propositions or statements 
(Ross), raisonnements (Dixsaut), postulati (Reale), arguments (Hackforth), theories (Treden-
nick) (for a selection, cf. e.g. Murphy, 1936, p. 40, Casertano, 2015, p. 360-362). Probably 
Plato’s intention was here only to contrast Socrates’ new method of dialectic with the old one 
of observations of facts. Therefore, he may also use the word in Phd. 100a1 in a non-
technical way as in Phd. 59a4 in the sense of “discussions,” and this would exclude only the 
translations with “Begriffe” and “ideas.”4 Nevertheless, D. Ross writes quite definitely: “The 
language of ‘agreement’, and the fact that what Plato calls the ‘strongest logos’ is the propo-
sition that Ideas exist, shows that logoi means statements or propositions” (Ross, 1951, p. 
27). But with the flight into the logoi, Plato also looks back to the Crito, where he describes 
his Socrates as “the kind of man who listens only to the logos [that is, the argument] that on 
reflection seems best (beltistos) to me” (Cri. 46b4-6). Later on, in the Parmenides, young 
Socrates’ eager desire epi tous logous (cf. Prm. 135d3) implies also a zeal for logoi in the 
sense of arguments. Therefore the expression “logos” means an expression with a sentential 
structure, but it is used in different ways by Plato: It can be rendered as “discussion,” as in 
Phd. 59a4, as “proposition” or “statement,” as in Phd. 100a4, but also as “argument,” that is, 
a logical connection of propositions, as in Phd. 100a1. The last translation seems especially 
suited to the methodological device that “[…] one must at least get hold of the best logos 
[that is, argument] that human beings have come up with, the hardest to refute (dysexelenkto-
tatos), […]” (Phd. 85c7-d1, Transl. Rowe). We could also say: One must get hold of the in-
ference to the Best Explanation concerning the destiny of our soul. Rowe translates this 
meaning of “logos” quite well as “reasoned account” (Rowe, 2010). Refuge in the “logoi” 
means refuge in reasoned accounts, that is, in arguments or simply theories, for theories, too, 
imply arguments:5 Therefore, I render the intended meaning of  
 [S1]: “So I thought I must take refuge in theories, and investigate the truth of things in 
the interior of them.”6 
[S2] makes an interesting addition and qualification: It declares the flight into theories to 
be an image (eikazô), and qualifies the image or eikasia as being in some sense not as exact. 
-------------------------------------------- 
4 So Loriaux, 1975, p. 93: “dès 99e5, tous logous vise plus que de simples ‘notions.’” 
5 Cf. Murphy, 1936, p. 40-41: “[...]; logoi are verbally contrasted with erga, and perhaps some 
word like ‘theories’, though it is not an exact equivalent, would bring out this contrast, [...].” 
6 I adopt “in the interior of them” from the translation of Dixsaut (1991): “[...], et, à l’intérieur de 
ces raisonnements, examiner la vérité des êtres.” 
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What is not exact about this image? To see reality through an image suggests indirect access 
to reality, which shows the reality not as it is itself, but only as it is for us. 
[S3] “[…] is confusing” (Gallop, 1975, p. 178).7 It can have at least two different inter-
pretations. I call these the common and the astonishing interpretations. In the common inter-
pretation, the indirect way of theories is not inferior to the direct way, because theories are 
also images of reality, namely “pictures in words,” as the image of the sun in water is an im-
age of the real sun, although theories are “images of a higher grade” (Gallop, 1975, p. 178).8 
Logoi, or arguments, would then be on the same level as eikasia, that is, conjecture through 
images (cf. R. 511e2), as the sun seen in water is an image of the real phenomenon. The up-
shot of Socrates’ flight into the logoi would be that theories are also not exact images. Socra-
tes would then in some sense anticipate Wittgenstein’s picture-theory of language and 
thought: “The picture is a model of reality” (TLP 2. 12). As “a model of reality,” a picture is 
not an exact representation of reality. The flight into the logoi would be the flight from blind-
ness to inexactness. 
In the second way, S3 makes the astonishing claim that the indirect way of arguments is 
nevertheless not inferior to the direct: A medium, like an image, gets us to reality itself, as 
does the direct way by vision. Since the common interpretation insinuates that the Platonic 
Socrates adheres to the logical impossibility that the logoi which posit ideas (cf. Phd. 100b5) 
depict first what they then posit, and leaves open the question about what false logoi would 
depict, I prefer the astonishing interpretation. As an aside: Logoi (and hypotheses) are for 
Socrates not on the same level as eikasia.9 
In the astonishing interpretation, Socrates will, as in the common interpretation, “not al-
together admit that his method of studying things is less direct than that of the physicists 
[…]” (Ross, 1953, p. 27). But the astonishing interpretation gives quite a different twist to 
these words than the common one does: The physicists study things en ergois, that is, in real-
ity.10 Socrates studies things en tois logois, that is, in arguments. If Socrates “will not alto-
gether admit that his indirect method of studying things is less direct than that of the physi-
cists,” then his indirect method is not less direct than that of the physicists. If it is not less di-
rect, it is at least on an equal footing to the physicists’ method of getting at the truth of things.  
-------------------------------------------- 
7 “The sentence in which Socrates qualifies his comparison of ‘theories’ with images (a1 -2) is con-
fusing [...]”.  
8 The common interpretation has been defended e.g. by Gallop, 1975, p. 178; Bostock, 1986, p. 
157-162; Gadamer, 1978, p. 254, Thanassas, 2003; Dancy, 2004, p. 295, though refuted by Murphy, 
1936, p. 43: “the logoi are in no sense like the things being studied, and it becomes equally clear as we 
read on that the logoi are not logoi of the things. [...]. But surely they are independent propositions and 
thoughts introduced ab extra.” Gallop, 1975, p. 178, makes the confusion still greater when he writes 
that theories are “images of a higher grade.” What is an image of “higher grade”? A sharper or a more 
blurry image? 
9 Cf. Apelt, 1928, ad locum: “Der Vergleichspunkt, meint Platon, ist nur der, dass in beiden 
Fällen eine indirekte Betrachtungsweise vorliegt: dort das Bild der Sonne, nicht die Sonne selbst, hier 
der Begriff des Dings, nicht die Dinge selbst. Im übrigen, sagt er, liegt das Verhältnis ganz verschieden. 
Die Begriffe stehen an an Seinswert über den Dingen, das Sonnenbild unter dem Sinnending, das es 
darstellt, d.h. unter der Sonne selbst. Die Begriffe stehen nicht nur über den Bildern der Sinnendinge, 
sondern sogar über den Sinnendingen selbst, den diese haben nur den Wert von Abbildern, und das 
Sonnenbild ist nur ein Bild vom Bild.” Cf. also Dixsaut, 1991, p. 140: “Saisir une réalité à travers un 
discours réflexif, ce n’est pas n’en saisir qu’une image. Au contraire, c’est l’expérience concrète qui ne 
livre que l’image de la chose, alors que la réfléxion accède à sa réalité véritable.” 
10 Robin, 1950, p. XLIX: “L’expression en ergois, [...] fait penser à l’energeia d’Aristote: acte qui 
est à la fois forme logique et réalité; qui, à l’état pur, est Dieu même.” 
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The question now arises: How is it possible that the indirect way of arguments is on an 
equal footing with the direct way of seeing, that is: to skopein en logois ta onta on equal foot-
ing with to skopein ta onta en ergois? 
This problem is analogous to the problem that was called by G. Vlastos “The problem of 
the elenchos”;11 I call it the problem of the hypothesis. For all the “reasoned accounts” or 
theories can do is to arrive at symphônia, that is, harmony or concord (cf. Phd. 100a5). The 
expression symphônia or “concord” has been made more precise by R. Robinson here and at 
101d5 by distinguishing “consistency” from deducibility (cf. Prt. 333a6-8; Grg. 457a1-3; 
Phdr. 270c6-7).12 I cannot enter here into the logical problems which the translations “consis-
tency” and “deducibility” offer.13 I make only the following point concerning consistency. If 
a hypothesis leads to inconsistent consequences, then it is supposed to be false: “If anyone 
should question the hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and refuse to answer until you 
could consider whether its consequences were mutually consistent or not” (Phd. 101d3-5, 
Transl. Rowe). If the consequences are not mutually consistent, then the hypothesis is false. 
But consistency or “concord” is only a negative test of truth.14 Nevertheless, we can ask 
the question which remains open: Logoi or theories may be consistent or harmonious, but are 
they also true in the sense of corresponding to reality? Mere consistency is for the Platonic 
Socrates not by itself a guarantee of truth (cf. R. 533c2-5; Crat. 436c7-d7). In fact, we find in 
Plato not only consensus (homologia) (cf. Grg. 487e6-7) or consistency (symphônia) as a cri-
terion of truth (Phd. 100a4-7), but also correspondence: “A true logos says that which is, and 
a false logos says that which is not” (Crat. 385b7-8; cf. Sph. 263b3-7). If his Socrates tries to 
investigate “in the interior of the logoi” “the truth of things” — that is, the reality of things — 
he tries to arrive by his flight into the logoi at the reality of things. Therefore, [S3] seems to 
indicate that coherence is no less a way to truth than correspondence is. Metaphorically 
speaking, the second sailing is no less a method to arrive at the goal — “the truth of things” 
— than is the first; or the rowing boat is no less a vehicle to get to the final destination than is 
the sailing boat. Or to put it differently again: By dreaming as Socrates does (Phd. 60e1-
61a4; cf. Symp. 175e2-3), we arrive at reality as in a state of wakefulness, whereas by seeing 
with our eyes, we are blinded.  
Or to use another metaphor which the Platonic Socrates then uses in the Republic: By 
“surviving all refutations” (dia pantôn elenchôn diexiôn) (R. 534c1-2) with a “logos not li-
able to fall” (aptôti tô<i> logo<i>) (R. 534c3), the philosopher-kings and -queens not only 
-------------------------------------------- 
11 Vlastos, 1983, p. 38-39: “The question then becomes how Socrates can claim, [...]to have proved 
that the refutand is false, when all he has established is the inconsistency of p with premisses whose 
truth he has not undertaken to establish in that argument: they have entered the argument simply as 
propositions on which he and the interlocutor are agreed. This is the problem of the Socratic elenchus 
[...].”  
12 Cf. Robinson, 1953, p. 131. 
13 Cf. Robinson, 1953, p. 126-136. But cf. now also Kahn, 1996, p. 316: “I suggest that the term for 
consequence is deliberately avoided, because Plato is here presenting the method hypothesis as more 
flexible and also more fruitful than logical inference. [...] Whatever is incompatible with some basic fea-
ture of the model, as specified in the hupothesis, will be ‘out of tune’ (diaphônein) or fail to accord. But 
the positive relationship of ‘being in accord’ (sumphônein, synâidein) is not mere consistency. It means 
fitting into the structure, bearing some positive relationship to the model by enriching or expanding it in 
some way.” 
14 Cf. Robinson, 1953, p. 135-136: “‘Seeing whether the results accord’, considered as a test, is 
merely negative. It can sometimes show that the hypothesis must be abandoned, but never that it must 
retained.” 
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get at an infallible or irrefutable logos, but they are “brought at last to the goal” (R. 540a6), 
namely “to lift up the eye of the soul to gaze on that which sheds light on all things” (R. 
540a7-9), that is, “the Good itself” (R. 540c8-9) or “a principle that is not a hypothesis” (an-
hypothetos archê) (R. 510b7), to which the “something sufficient” (ti hikanon, Phd. 101e1) 
may allude (cf. Gallop, 1975, p. 190-191).15 
This is quite an astonishing claim. The question was in principle already aptly formu-
lated by Donald Davidson: 
But there is not much comfort in mere consistency. Given that it is almost certainly the case 
that some of our beliefs are false (though we know not which), making our beliefs consistent 
with one another may as easily reduce as increase our store of knowledge. (Davidson, 2005, p. 
223)  
In fact, the flight into the logoi takes the risk that some of the logoi — or even the logos 
judged to be the “strongest” (Phd. 100a4), that is “the hardest to refute” (dysexelenktotatos) 
(Phd. 85c9-d1) — are false. Now the method with which the Platonic Socrates takes refuge in 
the logoi in the Phaedo is the method of mathematics known from the Meno as the method of 
hypothesis (ex hypotheseôs) (Men. 86e3). But in the Phaedo, it is neither a mathematical hy-
pothesis that is put forward nor the meta-ethical hypothesis that virtue is a science: “if virtue 
is a science, then it would be teachable” (Men. 87c5-6). It is the hypothesis that ideas exist 
where “is” has the emphatic Parmenidean meaning of being real or really real (ontôs on): 
My aim is to try to show you the kind of reasons that engage me, and for that purpose I’m go-
ing to go back to those much-talked-about entities (polythrylêta) of ours - starting from them, 
and hypothesizing that there’s something that’s beautiful and nothing but beautiful, in and by 
itself, and similarly with good, big, and all the rest. If you grant me these, and agree that they 
exist, my hope is, starting from them, to show you the reason for things and establish that the 
soul is something immortal. (Phd. 100b1-9. Transl. Rowe) 
The reasoning is roughly this: If the hypothesis of ideas is true, then the soul is immortal. 
Not only does the theory of ideas depend on a hypothesis, but the final proof of the immortal-
ity of the soul also depends on the theory of ideas: The final proof depends on the theory of 
ideas (Phd. 100b7-9), and the ideas depend on a hypothesis or premise.16  
But Socrates does not do in the Phaedo what Parmenides does later in the Parmenides: to 
consider the consequences of the negations of his hypothesis, namely, “if that same thing is 
hypothesized (hypotithesthai) not to be” (Prm. 136a1-2). What are the consequences if “the 
beautiful, the good and every such reality” (Phd. 76d8-9) are hypothesized not to be? In fact, 
Socrates assumes concerning the preexistence of the soul: “If these realities do not exist, then 
this argument is altogether futile” (Phd. 76e4-5). 
But how without that does the Socrates of the Phaedo know that his hypothesis of the in-
dividual ideas is not false? In fact, Plato’s first interpreter, Aristotle, would say that the poly-
thrulêta — the Platonic ideas — are teretismata (An. post. A 22 83a33), that is, twitters, and 
to speak of ideas as paradigms and participating is kenologein, idle talk (cf. Metaph. A 9 
991a21-22). Aristotle refers with this critique to the deuteros plous of the Phaedo (cf. 
Metaph. A 9 991b3-7).17 In De generatione et corruptione, he attributes the theory not to 
Plato, but to “Socrates in the Phaedo” (cf. GC B 9 335b10-14). 
-------------------------------------------- 
15 This is nevertheless a disputable issue, cf. Verdenius, 1958, p. 231. 
16 Cf. now Sedley, 2018, in this volume. 
17 Cf. now the careful article of Delcomminette (2015). 
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The answer of Socrates in the “Meno” was: “We have like the slave of Meno hidden in 
us true opinions, because we are ‘fallen souls’, for ‘the truth of things’ is always in our soul” 
(cf. Men. 86b1). D. Davidson thus writes correctly in the article “Plato’s Philosopher”: 
[T]he assumption is that, in moral matters, everyone has true beliefs which he cannot aban-
don and which entail the negations of his false beliefs. It follows from this assumption that all 
the beliefs in a consistent set of beliefs are true, so a method like the elenchus which weeds 
out inconsistencies will in the end leave nothing standing but truths. (Davidson, 2005, p. 229) 
In the same vein, Socrates could say in the Phaedo: Everyone has hidden true beliefs 
about the universals like the equal (Phd. 74a5-75a3). The hypothesis of ideas will remain at 
the end true because an examination of this hypothesis would leave realism as the only viable 
option about the universals. We arrive through the deuteros plous at the same result as 
through the prôtos, because in us are true opinions about the universals that cannot be shaken 
but must be made explicit by cross-examination.  
Metaphorically, we can give the answer in the following way: The rowing boat has in it-
self a sail, which can be hoisted, that is, by skopein en tois logois, we arrive at the alêtheia 
tôn ontôn en ergois. Or, to use another metaphor: Our soul as the “place of ideas” (topos 
eidôn) (Aristotle de An.  4 429a28)18 is a mirror of the truth, but has to be purified from its 
hidden contradictions by an examination of the logoi until it can see the unveiled truth.  
Again, in the same vein, Socrates could say: Everyone has hidden true beliefs about his 
soul and its destiny after his death, for example that the soul brings life (cf. Phd.105d3-4, 
Cra. 399d11-e2, Lg. 895c11-12). The hypothesis of the immortality of the soul will remain at 
the end true because an examination of this hypothesis by cross-examination would leave it 
as the only viable option.  
But there is a caveat: As long as our soul is in a body, we may come in the best case as 
near as possible or “very near” (engutata) (Phd. 65e4, 67a3) to the truth, but it remains at a 
“distance” from the truth — caused by our corporeality. There is a distance between pure 
knowledge and the closest approach to this knowledge in life which is not possible to bridge 
by a “shortcut” (atrapos) (Phd. 66b4):  
[If] it’s impossible to get pure knowledge of anything in the company of the body, then one or 
the other of two things must hold: Either knowledge can’t be acquired, anywhere, or it can be, 
but only when we’re dead; because that’s when the soul will be alone by itself, apart from the 
body, and not until then. (Phd. 66e4-67a2)  
If this principle is applied to the soul, it is impossible to acquire pure knowledge of its 
immortality in the company of the body, that is, in this life, although it may be possible to 
attain different degrees of approximations, depending on the degrees of separation from the 
body (cf. Phd. 67a2-3).19 But only after death would we not only believe, but really know if 
we are immortal, if we are after death — paradoxically speaking — still alive. For us, Socra-
tes has departed “like a bee, leaving his sting behind” (Phd. 91c5). 
As I have shown elsewhere, this impossibility to arrive at pure knowledge remains true 
for Plato right up to the digression in the 7th letter “because of the weakness of logoi or argu-
ments” (dia to tôn logon asthenes) (Ep. VII 343a1)20 — a corollary of the “human weakness” 
(Phd. 107b1; cf. Lg. 853e10-854a1) caused by the embodiment of our souls. 
-------------------------------------------- 
18 Cf. Ferber, 2007, p. 183.  
19 Cf. Fine, 2016, p. 563-564. 
20 Cf. Ferber, 2007, esp. p. 56-66, 106-120. The interpretation of Burnyeat, 2015, p. 121-132, does 
not take into account this discussion. Cf. now the critique of Burnyeat by Szlezák, 2017, p. 311-323, esp. 
p. 318-320. 
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III
I arrive now at the question of how we can apply this to the proofs for the immortality of 
the soul and the ontological argument for the existence of God. Since David Sedley has this 
morning already given an excellent reconstruction with a translation of the final proof of im-
mortality, I will rely on his reconstruction: 
“Well now, what do we call that which does not admit death?” 
“Deathless/immortal [athanaton].” 
“Does soul not admit death?” 
“No.” 
“Then soul is something deathless/immortal?” “It is something deathless/immortal.” 
“Well now,” said Socrates, “are we to say that this has been proved? What do you think?” 
“Yes, and most sufficiently, Socrates.” (Phd. 105e2-10, Transl. Sedley) 
This argument has a certain affinity with the ontological argument used by Descartes in 
his 5th Meditation. I prefer Descartes’ version of the ontological argument because it has 
more affinity with the final proof than does Anselm’s. Like the Phaedo, the Meditations also 
tries to prove the immortality of the soul, as is indicated by the subtitle of the first edition 
(1641), “In qua Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demonstratur”: 
[...] from the fact that I cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is in-
separable from God, and hence that he really exists. It is not that my thought makes it so, or 
that it imposes any necessity on anything; but, on the contrary, it is the necessity which lies in 
the thing itself, that is, the necessity of the existence of God, which determines me to think in 
this way: for it is not in my power to conceive a God without existence, that is, a being su-
premely perfect, and yet devoid of an absolute perfection, as I am free to imagine a horse with 
or without wings. (AT 7, 67; 5th Meditation, Transl. J. Veitch/J. Cottingham) 
The analogy consists in the following: As the final argument for the existence of an im-
mortal soul concludes from the meaning of the expression “soul” or “psychê” that a soul does 
not admit death and is — after the “ultimate final” proof — indestructible (cf. Phd. 106d5-
7),21 so too does the ontological argument conclude from the meaning of the word “God” as 
implying “existence” in the sense of a perfection that God also exists and is real (existentiam 
a Deo esse inseparabilem, ac proinde illum revera existere) (AT 7, 67). Both try to prove the 
existence of something — in one case the existence of God and in the other case the existence 
of an immortal soul — by the method of a skopein en logois. By a skopein en logois, we are 
supposed to arrive at the alêtheia tôn ontôn. In Kantian terms: Both propositions — “God 
exists” and “The soul is immortal” — are on the one hand analytic, and their negations — 
“God does not exist” and “The soul is mortal” — therefore false. On the other hand, they pre-
sume to give substantive information about the reality. Let’s therefore call the “ultimate final 
proof” the ontological argument for the immortality of the soul.  
Of course, there remain doubts: doubts about the validity of the proof for the immortality 
of the soul and for the existence of God. I cannot open the whole battery of arguments for and 
against the ontological argument, or for and against the immortality of the soul. Johannes Ca-
terus, the author of the First Set of Objections to the Meditations, writes e.g.: 
Even if it is granted that a supremely perfect being carries the 
implication of existence in virtue of its very title, it still 
does not follow that the existence in question is 
anything actual in the real world (in rerum natura actu quid esse); 
all that follows is that the concept of existence is inseparably 
-------------------------------------------- 
21 Cf. For the expression “ultimate final” Pakaluk, 2010, p. 643-677. 
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(conceptum existentiae inseparabilter) linked to the 
concept of a supreme being. So you cannot infer 
that the existence of God is anything actual (actu quid esse) unless 
you suppose that the supreme being actually exists (actu existere); for 
then it will actually contain all perfections, including the perfection of 
real existence. (Adam/Tannery 7:99, Transl. Cottingham). 
This objection has a similarity to the objection of Strato of Lampsacus against the “ulti-
mate final” proof for the immortality of the soul: 
Never can it rashly be accepted that, if the soul does not admit death and is in this sense 
deathless, it is also indestructible: immortal is namely also a stone in this way, but it is not in-
destructible. (Tr. Ferber).22 
Although a stone is not a living being, the example is well chosen to illustrate a weak-
ness of the “ultimate final” proof: It proves only that a soul is deathless as long as it is alive, 
but therefore it is not indestructible. In other words: Whereas the predicate “deathless” de-
scribes a conceptual or second order attribute of the soul of which we do not have any real 
experience, the predicate “indestructible” describes a real or first order attribute of which we 
can have real experience like that of a (relatively) indestructible stone. In the same way: If a 
supremely perfect being carries the implication of existence in the conceptual sense it does 
not carry the implication of existence in the real or “actual” sense.  
To meet this objection, Descartes replies to J. Caterus: “But, from the fact that we under-
stand [by clear and distinct perception] that actual existence is necessarily and always con-
joined with the other attributes of God, it certainly does follow that God exists” 
(Adam/Tannery  117, Transl. Cottingham). But Descartes leaves the decisive point open 
about whether the existence of God is a really or “actually” real or only a conceptually real 
predicate of God. 
So the question remains: What do these arguments prove, the really real (ontôs on, 
revera) or only the conceptually real existence of God or an immortal/indestructible soul? We 
do not have the reply of Plato to Strato (c. 335–c. 269 BC), but only of Damascius (c. 458–
after 538) to Strato, who seems to have sided with Strato.23 
But if God and the immortal/indestructible soul are only conceptually real, would they 
not presuppose something really real? In an analogous vein: If the Platonic ideas were only 
thoughts, were these thoughts not thoughts of something, namely Platonic ideas (cf. Prm. 
132b4-c8)? The history of the ontological argument seems to be a virtually never-ending 
story. 
The fact remains that these proofs did not convince everybody, and, without a doubt, the 
proof for the immortality of the soul did not convince the mature Aristotle (cf. de An. 
407b20-24 with b1-5) any more than the proofs for the Platonic theory of ideas did. It is also 
significant that Plato did not return to the final proof of the Phaedo for the immortality of the 
soul, but did develop three other proofs (cf. R. 610e5-611a2; Phdr. 245c5-246e3; Lg. 894e3-
895c11, 896a1-b3). The immortality of the soul remained for Plato, as for his Socrates in the 
Meno (81a10-b7), “an old and holy saying” (palaios te kai hieros logos) (Ep. VII 335a3) to 
be obeyed although “hard to prove” (dysapodeikton, cf. R. 488a1). Therefore — perhaps — 
he whose “faith was strong but he needed proof” — tried it again and again. Moreover, even 
his Socrates of the Phaedo seems not finally convinced when he says to Simmias: “[...] our 
initial hypotheses [the hypothesis of ideas] really must be examined more clearly, even if the 
two of you do find them trustworthy” (107b5-7, Transl. Rowe). The initial hypotheses are the 
-------------------------------------------- 
22 Wehrli, 1969, fr 123, h, p. 38. 
23 Cf. Gertz, 2015, p. 255. 
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hypotheses of “the beautiful, the good and every such reality” (Phd. 76d8-9), that is, the hy-
potheses of the individual Platonic ideas. But when Platonic ideas are presupposed for the 
existence of an immortal soul, the theory of ideas needs first to be established. But for the 
theory of ideas, we find in the whole Corpus Platonicum perhaps only one “direct argument” 
(Kahn, 1996, p. 330), namely at Tim. 51d3-51e6.24 The “Sticks and Stones” argument (Phd. 
74a5-75a3) presupposes the theory of ideas with its employment of the emphatic Parmenid-
ean meaning of esti (Phd. 75b6), but does not yet prove the theory,25 any more than the other 
passages of the Phaedo prove the theory of Ideas (Phd. 65d4-5, 76d7-9, 78d3-7, 100b3-7) in 
a direct and formal way. So the final proof remains somewhat in the air.  
Nevertheless, with the metaphor of a “raft” with which one can sail through life (Phd. 
85d1-2), the Socrates of the Phaedo indicates not only the instrumental character of the flight 
into the logoi as a Hilfskonstruktion, but also of the hypothesis of the theory of ideas, which 
Plato, too, later on “never asserts to be definitely true.”26 A raft is not a stable vehicle like a 
sailing or a rowing boat, although it can have, like the raft of Odysseus, sails as well (cf. 
Hom. Od. 5.259-261). A voyage on a raft with oars and a sail which can be hoisted may also 
be an apt metaphor for the Socratic deuteros plous in the Phaedo. But for all its instability, a 
raft with oars and a sail is still a better way than swimming without a raft through the trou-
bled water — the pontos atrygetos of the genesis and phthora of our lives — if probably 
many or most of us, like Simmias, can neither find out the truth about the destiny of our soul 
in a direct way by our sensory organs nor rely on a presumed divine — that is, a superhuman 
— utterance.27 
-------------------------------------------- 
24 Cf. Ferber, 1997. 
25 Pace Forcignanò, in this volume, cf. Svavarsson, 2009, p. 60: “The argument is not intended to 
establish that there are Forms; their existence is explicitly assumed.” 
26 Burnyeat & Frede, 2015, p. 167, n. 76. 
27 For stimulating discussions, I thank the audience during my presentation in the plenary session 
of 7th July 2016, esp. Andrea Capra, Barbara Sattler and Harold Tarrant.  
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